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ARGUMENT

<

POINT I
RESPONDENT'S STIPULATION AT TRIAL WAIVING
CLAIMS UNDER THE ORDERLY SCHOOL TERMINATION
PROCEDURES ACT AND CONCEDING NON-COMPLIANCE
WITH THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT BARS HIM
FROM RAISING THOSE ISSUES ON APPEAL.

{

Through the course of this litigation and up until the
time of trial/ respondent claimed a breach of contract and
a violation by appellant of the provisions of the Utah
Orderly School Termination Procedures Act.

Just prior to

trialf however, respondent abandoned his claim against appellant for violation of the Termination Procedures Act/
and also stipulated on the record there had been no attempt
whatever to comply with the provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

The record on that matter was quoted

verbatim in Appellant's Brief at page 7.
The law with respect to a stipulation made in open
court is clear and unambiguous:
"While the issues in a case are usually such as
are made by the pleadings/ litigants are nevertheless at liberty to prescribe the issues to
be tried/ provided the issues are within the
power of the court to try/ and they may modify
or limit the issues made by the pleadings and
stipulate for a trial on the merits regardless
of such issues." 83 C.J.S. STIPULATIONS/ §10 (f)
(1953/ as supplemented).
As a general rule stipulation of parties or counsel made in
pending proceedings are conclusive as to all matters properly
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I

i

contained or included therein.

The subject matters of the

agreement and stipulation under consideration here are well
within the purview of applicable general rules.

In Evans

v. Raper, 185 Okla. 426, 93 P.2d 754, 755 (1939), it is
stated:
"It is a well settled proposition of law that
litigants may stipulate concerning their respective rights involved in the case and are
bound thereby where the agreements contained
in the stipulation are not obtained through
fraud, or not contrary to law or public policy,
and that the courts will enforce the same."
See also City of Los Angeles v. Cole, 170 P.2d 928 (Calif.
1946).

At 83 C.J.S. STIPULATIONS, §22 p. 46 (1953, as supple-

mented) appears the following rule applicable to stipulations
relating to issues:
"The rules governing the construction and operation and effect of stipulations generally apply
to stipulations with respect to the issues. Accordingly, the parties are bound by stipulations
fixing the issues . . ., and will not be permitted
to depart therefrom."
To the same effect is 83 C.J.S. STIPULATIONS, §12 (1953, as
supplemented):
"Where a party by stipulation makes a concession or adopts a theory on which his cause of
action is determined, he must abide by it on
appeal." (Emphasis added).
In Garaventa v. Gardella, 169 P.2d 540 (Nev. 1946), an
administratrix brought action against a son of the decedent
to recover stock allegedly held by the son in trust for his
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brothers and sisters.

Early in the trial, before any offer

of proof concerning the alleged transfer of stock was made,
both parties waived the provisions of Nevada's deadman
statute, which provided in part that no person shall be
allowed to testify when the other party to the transaction
is dead.

Later, when plaintiff objected to a question con-

cerning a conversation between the trustee and decedent, the
court sustained the objection, reasoning it did not have the
right to recognize the stipulation.

The Nevada court ruled

otherwise on appeal, recognizing the trial court's refusal
to honor the stipulation between counsel as error.
To the same effect is Gee v. Baum, 58 Utah 545, 199 P.680
(1921).

There, in an action to set aside deeds of conveyance,

it was stipulated by the parties that a certain tract of land
should be eliminated from the action.

Nonetheless, the trial

court decree included the parcel designated for exclusion
by the stipulation.

This court held it manifest error for the

trial court to ignore the stipulation of counsel and include
the parcel of land within the Decree.
The stipulation of counsel on the record before this
court is clear.

The matters to which the stipulation related

are substantial, and in its absence the trial below would
have proceeded in a wholly different manner.

Compliance

with the Governmental Immunity Act constitutes one of
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appellant's primary defenses herein.

The claims of respon-

dent under the Orderly Termination Procedures Act was also
a matter of substance and waiver of such claims prior to
trial completely eliminated the presentation of proof by
both parties at trial regarding said claims.

Respondent

cannot now attempt to resurrect those issues on appeal in
an attempt to inject new issues into this case on appeal.
Those issues were finally laid to rest by the stipulation
of respondent's counsel prior to trial.
POINT II
THE 1975 AMENDMENT TO THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT PERMITTING ACTIONS
FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT AGAINST GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES WITHOUT STATUTORY NOTICE
OPERATES PROSPECTIVELY ONLY.
The cause of action which respondent is pursuing herein
arose in 1973.

In 1975 the Utah Legislature amended the

Governmental Immunity Act to permit filing of actions for
breach of contract without prior compliance with- the statutory notice and claim provisions of Sections 63-30-12, 13
and 19 of that Act.
Respondent argues that the 1975 Amendment was procedural in nature and therefore is entitled to retrospective
application.

This argument is not well-founded.

It cannot be disputed that the Governmental Immunity
Act created statutory rights of action where none had
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-4-

existed at common law.

Stevens v. Salt Lake County/ 25

Ut.2d 168, 478 P.2d 496 (1970).

In order for the statutory

cause of action to be pursued, however, this court has rei

quired strict compliance with the notice and claims provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act as a condition
precedent to bringing the action. Roosendaal Construction
i

and Mining vs. Holman, 28 Ut.2d 396, 503 P.2d 446 (1972).
See also Childers v. U.S., 442 F.2d 1299, 1303 (5th Cir.
1971).

As a condition precedent, the notice and claim
i

provisions are substantive because non-compliance effectively bars the action.

See, Scarborough v. Granite School

District, 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975).
In a recent case, this court followed analogous reasoning in holding the contribution statute (U.C.A. 1953,
§78-27-39) to operate prospectively only.

In Brunyer v.

Salt Lake County, 551 P.2d 521 (Utah 1976), this court reasoned that because the contribution statute created a right
of action where none existed previously, it was not merely
remedial or procedural, but rather, affected matters of
substance and was therefore entitled only to prospective
application.

The reasoning of Brunyer is applicable to the

case at bar.

Compliance with the notice and claim provi-

sions was a sine qua non to a right of action against a
governmental entity for breach of contract under the
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Governmental Immunity Act prior to the 1975 Amendment.
v. Logan City, 27 Ut.2d 291, 495 P.2d 814 (1972).

Baugh

Without

the Act and compliance therewith, no right of action existed
at common law.

Thus, elimination of the conditions precedent

imposed by the notice and claim provisions affects the very
substance of the claim and cannot, therefore, be viewed
merely as remedial or procedural.
Further, no legislative intent is evidenced by the 1975
Amendment which would indicate that the legislature contemplated retrospective application.

In the absence of such

intent, the presumption is that the Amendment applies
prospectively only.
supplemented).

82 C.J.S. STATUTES, §319 (1953, as

Thus, the 1975 Amendment to U.C.A. §63-30-5

(1953, as amended) is entitled only to prospective application.
POINT III
THE UTAH ORDERLY SCHOOL TERMINATION
PROCEDURES ACT DOES NOT SUPERCEDE OR
CONFLICT WITH THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT.
The Termination Procedures Act is administrative in
nature.

Section 53-51-4 of that Act vests the board of

education of each school district with the right to contract
with its educators or their associations, or by resolution,
for establishment of orderly termination procedures. Sections 53-51-6 and 53-51-7 establish the procedure by which
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impartial hearings may be held before either the board or
appointed examiners to resolve termination disputes.

The

Governmental Immunity Act, however, is judicial in scope.
Its purpose is to increase the availability of court sanctioned redress from wrongs committed by governmental agencies.
The fact that a duality of possible remedies exists
under the Acts does not make them repugnant to each other.
As noted in 2 Am.Jur.2d, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, §784 (1962, as
supplemented):

ni

if "In some circumstances, two remedies may be
available to the same party for the enforcement of the same right, one in the judicial
and the other in the administrative forum,
one by virtue of statute and the other under
the common law, or both by reason of statute."
Moreover, the Termination Procedures Act makes explicit provisions for redress to an appropriate court of law.

Section

53-51-7 in pertinent part reads:
"The boards may delegate to such hearing examiners or may enter into contracts whereby said
hearing examiners may make decisions relating
to the employment of the educator which shall
be binding upon both the educator and the
board. Nothing herein shall be construed to
limit the right of either the board or the
educator to appeal to an appropriate court of
law." (Emphasis added).
The legislature, by virtue of the provisions of Section 7
has authorized court proceedings for enforcing and obtaining
relief under the Governmental Immunity Act quite apart from
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proceedings initiated by the examiner under the Termination
Procedures Act.

Nothing in the present case, however, makes

it necessary to attempt to determine the appropriate occasions for invoking the initial jurisdiction of the courts
rather than proceeding first through the examiner.

Of

primary importance is the fact that respondent's claim arose
fully two years before enactment of the Termination Procedures Act.

Secondly, assuming arguendo that the Act was in

existence when respondent's claim arose, nothing in the Act
makes administrative review by the board or the examiners
mandatory.

Section 7 provides only that the board and

educator may contractually enter into binding arbitration.
Section 53-51-6 similarly provides that "Hearings may be
held before the board . . . "

No evidence in support of a

contractual obligation to arbitrate was presented at trial.
In Gilbertson v. Culinary Alliance & Bartenders Union,
282 P.2d 632 (Ore. 1955), the Oregon court, in a labormanagement dispute, interpreted an analagous situation
where administrative and judicial remedies were available.
The proceeding involved alleged unlawful picketing.

From

an order by the hearing examiner commanding the union to
cease and desist, an appeal was filed with the intermediate
court of appeals.

That court sustained defendant's demurrer

and the labor examiner appealed.

Addressing respondent's
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claim of inconsistency in procedural provisions, the Supreme
Court noted:

- ^,, .;

11

It is enough to say that there is no necessary
inconsistency in the law because it provides
for alternative procedures; and, though it may
be that the two procedures cannot exist in entire
peace and harmony, at least they can coexist."
282 P.2d at 639.
•">

The Gilbertson court also criticized the contention, as
is made by respondent in the present case, that where irreconcilable conflict exists between various statutory provisions,
the last provision should prevail.

In holding that such

contention is without satisfactory basis and unsupported by
sound legislative practice, the court stated:
"We are not, however, compelled to resort to
use of a rule, everywhere considered arbitrary
and unsatisfactory, for the solution of the
present question; for we think that while the
provisions under consideration are apparently
irreconcilable, they are not actually and
necessarily so, and that under settled rules
of statutory interpretation they may be harmonized. That it is the court's duty to harmonize them, if possible, there can be no
doubt. (282 P.2d at 638). See also: University of Utah v. Richards, 20 Utah 457, 59 P.96
(1899); Lawson v. Tripp, 34 Utah 28, 95 P.520
(1908); Neldon v. Clark, 20 Utah 382, 59 P.524
(1899).
In Western Beverage Company of Provo v. Hansen, 98
Utah 232, 96 P.2d 1605 (1939), which respondent also cites,
this court was asked to resolve two apparently conflicting
statutes with respect to the question of whether or not the
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sale of property by a county for general taxes extinguishes
a city's lien imposed for special improvements.

In holding

the two provisions not inconsistent/ this Court noted that:
"All provisions [of a statute] must be given
effect in spite of apparent conflict if it is
possible to do so. 96 P.2d at 1108.
This Court also held, (despite respondent's argument to the
contrary), that:
"Differences of time [with respect to statutory
enactments] are to be disregarded in construing
a code, if, by disregarding them, and looking
at the work as a whole harmony can thereby be
produced;" 96 P.2d at 1108.
From Gilbertson and Western Beverage (supra) it may be
concluded that the legislature will not enact vain, meaningless and conflicting statutes.

Hence, even if this court

determined that the provisions of the Termination Procedures
Act apply, an interpretation should be adopted which gives
effect to each provision and harmonizes them with each other
so that neither will be meaningless.

The Termination Proce-

dures Act and the Governmental Immunity Act are not irreconcilable.

The desired harmony in the present action can best

be achieved by recognition of both the administrative nature
of the Termination Procedures Act and the judicial scope of
the Governmental Immunity Act.

Nothing contained therein

precludes a claimant from pursuing administrative relief
without sacrificing the substantive right to have such claim
presented before the appropriate court of law.

-10-
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CONCLUSION
Respondent has stipulated on the record before this
court that no attempt whatsoever was made to comply with the
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

The law

in this state in effect at the time respondent's claim arose
clearly provided that respondent's failure to give notice of
the claim as required by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
was necessary in a breach of contract action•

Respondent's

stipulation of non-compliance with that Act and abandonment
of his claim against appellant for violation of the Utah
Orderly School Termination Procedures Act bar him from
raising these issues on appeal.
The 197 5 Amendment to the Governmental Immunity Act
deleting prior notice requirements operates prospectively
only and does not operate to bar appellant's valid defense.
The provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act are
fully compatible with the provisions of the School Termination Procedures Act insofar as the Governmental Immunity Act
provides court-sanctioned remedies while the Termination
Procedures Act is administrative in nature and expressly
preserves a claimant's right to bring suit in a state district court.
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For the foregoing reasons, appellant requests that this
Court reverse the judgment below and award the appellant's
its costs.
Respectfully submitted,
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN

By_
Merlin R. Lybbert

BY.
George A. Hunt
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) copies of
the foregoing Reply Brief to counsel for respondent, Michael
T. McCoy, 414 Walker Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111,
this

day of October, 1976.

George A. Hunt
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